Radical phenomenology, ontology, and international political theory
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This article is a contribution to the investigation of the possible methodologies available to the study of global politics. Conceived as a rejoinder to those who demand not merely positivist but rigorous research, it is motivated by the belief that "reflection" can be true to itself only when made concrete by acute attention to the specificity of worldly phenomena. To this end, I outline what might be broadly referred to as a "phenomenological method."

Phenomenology's demand that one attend to "the things themselves" offers, I suggest, an opportunity critically to examine the commitment to theoretical constructs that remain wedded to ontological perspectives that resist the ever-changing "facticity" of social interaction. (1) In particular, I examine the strand of phenomenology pioneered by Martin Heidegger, who, in the 1920s, rearticulated it as a method for ontological examination.

Following the philosophical exposition of Heidegger's reformulation of phenomenology, the article subsequently juxtaposes Thomas Hobbes's account of subjectivity as self-interested and concerned with its own survival with the account of selfhood offered by Heidegger's phenomenological investigations into the "facticity" of human existence. The attunement to facticity witnessed in Heidegger's radical deconstruction (Abbau) of modern subjectivity, I argue, has profound ramifications for theorizing social relations in that it contests the very possibility of an international social and political theory based on a self-interested, autonomous subject, examples of which still have continued salience in IR. (2)

Indeed, this article takes as its point of departure the conviction that the understanding of ourselves under the sign of modern subjectivity produces a set of assumptions about us and others based on "a mindset of valuation, disposal, management, and objectification in our care for our lives--a mindset whose overpowering force hems us in throughout our everyday world, confuses freedom with the condition of possibility for certain types of subjectivity, and gives priority to correctness and measurement in matters of truth." (3)

The article suggests, instead, the need to develop, through the consideration of the contributions of radical phenomenology, a theoretical sensibility that is attuned to the existence of a self constituted by otherness, a self that is explicitly aware of its heteronomous constitution so as to promote an international political theory that has at its center, not the modern subject, but rather an understanding of coexistence as the proximal fact of human life.

Thinking About Phenomenology

A number of twentieth-century thinkers began their philosophical journeys in the general parameters of phenomenology as first articulated in the beginning of the century by Edmund Husserl. It has formed a point of departure for many subsequent thinkers such as Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer; Alfred Schutz, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and Werner Marx. However, it would be quite misleading to suggest that a general definition of phenomenology can be easily provided, since most of the aforementioned thinkers who worked within phenomenology have reconfigured its assumptions to fit their specific concerns and subject matter. (4)

Nevertheless, even in such a diverse field of enquiry, certain things are accepted as the means and tasks of inquiry. According to John Sallis, for example, phenomenology "is, in the first instance, the methodological demand, that one attend constantly and faithfully to the things themselves. It is the demand that philosophical thought proceed by attending to things as they themselves show themselves rather than in terms of presupposed opinions, theories, or concepts." (5)

As a philosophical approach or, more narrowly, a method, "phenomenology is thus an appeal to the things themselves." (6) The phrase the things themselves in turn refers to particular objects of perception, not as presupposed by historically prominent theoretical schemas, but as they show themselves. Attendance to the specificity of the perceptual object requires an acceptance that what is perceived when one looks at a particular object, for example a desk, is nothing other than the desk itself: "It involves taking seriously, for example, the fact that perception of such objects is always one-sided, that we see only one profile of the desk at a time," that only one side might be accessible to perception at any one time. (7)

Performed again, under different conditions or from a different perspective, the phenomenological method may yield very different results.

For phenomenology, however, perception does not denote merely the act of becoming aware of a thing through the senses. Husserl distinguished between man's involvement with things and the world, which he called the natural attitude (or, "naturalism"), and the phenomenological attitude. The latter denotes "the reflective point of view from which we carry out philosophical analysis of the intentions exercised in the natural attitude and the objective correlates of these intentions." (8) In order to be able to carry out such analysis, the phenomenologist has to achieve the suspension of the intentions and convictions that operate in the natural attitude. Such a suspension can occur through an event Husserl named "the phenomenological epoché." The epoché is not a doubt or negation of these intentions, as it was for Rene
Descartes, but rather a "distancing," or interruption of widely held assumptions, which is required in order to allow the phenomenologist to contemplate the structure of phenomena.

The method by which one achieves the epoche, or suspension of intentions, and by which one is able to move from the natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude, is called the phenomenological reduction. The reduction is, perhaps, the most salient feature of Husserlian and subsequent phenomenologies and can be understood as "a "leading back" from natural beliefs to the reflective consideration of intentions and their objects." (9)

In the words of Mary Warnock, the reduction "consists in putting on one side (in brackets) all that is known, normally assumed, about the objects of perception or thought in order to describe and, later, analyse them as pure phenomena." (10) Differing from an ordinary account of an object that one might give in the course of daily life, the phenomenological description focuses not on the object's particular features and outlook but instead on its "modes of experience and the modes of representation." (11) What is brought out by the phenomenological description, then, is "the ways in which it [the object] can be experienced." (12) Bracketing-out and description are crucial for unobjectified access to experience, which, Husserl had argued, theories of the natural sciences could not obtain.

Husserl became aware of the need for bracketing-out presupposed theories and assumptions about the perceptual object and of the modes by which it is experienced because he thought that it was highly problematic to "apply the model of the natural or positive sciences to the understanding of human consciousness." (13) He believed, in this respect, that the natural attitude merely acknowledged the physical presence or givenness of entities and, therefore, "either deny[d] the life of consciousness altogether or else "naturalises" it as a "fact" of physical reality." (14) When encountered through the natural attitude as mere objects, "the phenomena of consciousness are thereby deprived of their essential status as living intentional experience." (15) Performing the phenomenological reduction and suspending the attitude in which one finds oneself in the world carries the phenomenologist "back from the hitherto naively accepted world of objects, values and other men, to the transcendental subjectivity which "const itutes" them." (16)

Bracketing the world shows "how the ordinary objective world is dependent upon the perceiving and thinking subject," (17) such that what has been, thus far, taken for granted as existing independent of any act of perception is "shown to be given both existence and intelligibility or sense by my transcendental Ego." (18) For Husserl, then, the transcendental Ego is the "self" or consciousness left over after common assumptions previously held have been "reduced" or suspended. As Robert Sokolowski notes in this regard, "what we describe in such descriptions is our own being in the world and the activity of being truthful." (19)

Husserl, of course, was also striving toward restating the relation between knowing and the world. His desire for nonobjectified access was informed by the phenomenological insight that "the world is an experience which we live before it becomes an object which we know in some impersonal or detached fashion." (20) This statement contests at a fundamental level the subject/object dichotomy that permeates much social science and IR literature and replaces it with the primacy of relation: "Man and world are first and foremost in relation; it is only subsequently, at the reflective level of logic, that we divide them into separate entities." (21) In the first instance, then, phenomenology seeks to recover a pretheoretical attitude, lost in the course of theoretical construction and explanation, through which to gain access to life or "lived experience." Such a recovery of a pretheoretical and prereflective disposition toward the phenomena of experience can be hastened by bracketing out the imposition of theorectica I frameworks and schemata that prevent things from showing themselves in themselves.

Radical Phenomenology: Challenging Subjectivity

The particular strand of phenomenology associated with the early writings of Heidegger, who was Husserl's protege and assistant at the University of Freiburg in the early 1920s, is of special interest because the interpretative turn given to the phenomenological project by Heidegger renders it not only essential for the study of ontology, but also makes it especially attuned to the conditions of possibility of "reflection" itself. Heidegger understood phenomenology to be the method that attempted to investigate originary lived experience, and was, as such, his chosen method for his project of fundamental ontology. (22)

Importantly, however, his reformulation of phenomenology came about as he became concerned with Husserl's focus on the transcendental Ego. Subsequent phenomenologists, too, had focused on transcendental subjectivity, a tendency that, Heidegger believed, "defined the human being as a coherence of experience, a center of acts unified in an ego: they never raised the question of the sense [meaning] of Being of this, our own Dasein [being-there, or existence]. Instead, they fell back on traditional definitions dividing man into reason and sense, soul and body, inner and outer, without a sense of what holds these realities together as a whole." (23)

Heidegger regarded this reliance on traditional dichotomies as a debilitating remnant of Cartesianism. (24) To surpass these persisting "Cartesian" presuppositions that remained even in Husserl's thinking, Heidegger began, after World War I, the development of what he called "radical phenomenology," which he had come to consider philosophy's "highest and deepest possibility," and that became, in time, associated with the very possibility of existential analysis, which he undertook in Being and Time. (25)
Heidegger's interest in phenomenology "does not lie in its actuality as a philosophical 'movement' ['Richtung']. Higher than actuality stands possibility. We can understand phenomenology only by seizing upon it as a possibility." (26)

Heidegger's radicalization of phenomenology, therefore, centered on "explicating life as it presents itself to us in concrete, individual, historical existence." (27) He maintained that "philosophical" thinking should be conceived as being "more rigorous, more primordial than scientific knowing; it is more radical, more essential than the exploration of nature and life by the theorizing attitude of the sciences." (28) He sought to establish, therefore, that philosophy could not be understood as a theoretical science. Even for the "early" Heidegger, philosophy was already tied up with the possibility of disclosure, in that it "is a way of disclosing (living) experience." (29)

In his attempts to find a means of access to living experience, which did not abstract the subject of experience from its "world," Heidegger departed from the delineation of transcendental subjectivity with which Husserlian phenomenology had been occupied after the publication of the Ideas. Yet, it must be recalled that it was, in fact, Heidegger's response to Husserl's critics that led to Heidegger's departure toward accessing lived experience. (30) Specifically, it was while searching for his own way toward accessing lived experience that Heidegger engaged with the two fundamental objections rendered against phenomenology by Paul Natorp, the neo-Kantian philosopher associated with the "Marburg School." (31) Natorp had generally argued that phenomenology could not fulfill its desire to attend to the things themselves: "The 'stream' of living experience is brought to a halt by reflection; there is no immediate grasp (hold) of living experience." (32) Such an argument applied, not only to Husserl's work, but also to Heidegger's attempts to use phenomenology as the method for accessing lived experience for the restatement of the question of the meaning of Being. It is important that these two objections be considered in turn.

The first claim suggested that phenomenology could not have "intuitive access to its chosen subject-matter." (33) This objection amounted, Theodore Kisiel argues, to asking the following question: "How is the nonobjectifiable subject matter of phenomenology to be even approached without already theoretically inflicting an objectification upon it? How are we to go along with life reflectively without de-living it? (34) Such a fundamental challenge was aimed at the very basis of phenomenology as a means of access to lived experience that guarded against the objectification imposed by reflection and theoretical constructs.

The second objection voiced the doubt that, in addition to the first problem of accessibility, phenomenology was not able to express its purported access to its subject matter without recourse to theoretical construction. Again, in Kisiel's words, the problem of expression had to do with the fact that "phenomenology claims to merely describe what it sees. But description is circumscription into general concepts, a 'subsumption' under abstractions. The concrete immediacy to be described is thereby mediated into abstract contexts. There is no such thing as immediate description, since all expression, any attempt to put something into words, generalizes and so objectifies." (35)

Natorp insisted that reflective analysis always already transformed, or even deformed, the living experiences upon which it reflected. Specifically, in expressing its description and analysis of the perceptual object, phenomenology unwittingly generalized and created theoretical concepts, under which the immediate phenomena were conveyed. This, Natorp claimed, was a "devastation" brought onto lived experience. However, he himself had claimed that such a devastation could be undone by his own method of "reconstruction," according to which "analysis and interpretation can 'regain' (reconstruct) the 'wholeness of the subjective' (the immediately given prior to the analysis) from the primordial life of consciousness 'theoretically.'" (36)

Heidegger argued to the contrary that this proposed method of reconstruction could not successfully disclose the sphere of lived experience because, despite Natorp's arguments, "even reconstruction is objectification; it consists in construction, in theorizing." (37) For Heidegger, therefore, Natorp's method brought about the "absolutization of the logical" and the "most radical absolutization of the theoretical." (38) With respect to Natorp's objections as such, Heidegger responded by turning away from the transcendental or pure phenomenology of Husserl, toward Verstehen, or understanding, a school of thought largely associated with Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911). (39)

Heidegger's reply to the first objection regarding the accessibility to living experience "pointed to a non-intuitive form of access ... a certain familiarity which life already has of itself and which phenomenology needs only to repeat. This spontaneous experience of experience, this streaming return of experiencing life upon already experienced life, is the immanent historicity of life." (40) He cautioned against depending on and searching for "objectifying concepts which seize life and so still its stream," and encouraged the utilization of the kind of access that life already has to itself that "provides the possibility of finding less intrusive precepts or pre-concepts which at once reach back into life's motivation and forward into its tendency." (41)

This understanding that life already has of itself "stretches itself unitively and indifferently along the whole of the life stream without disrupting it." (42) Heidegger's response advocated against relying on the "abstractive objectifying universal" that extracts experience and subsumes it to the universal, which he had likened to the situation of "form subsuming matter." (43) Instead, Heidegger called for a "nonobjective option of a more indicative and intentional universal stemming directly from the very temporal intentional movement of finding oneself experiencing experience." (44)
It is crucial to note, however, that, in responding to the first objection, Heidegger also provided an answer to the second critique, which had contested the ability to express immediate experience. By turning to the access that life already has of itself "the problems of intuition and expression are therefore transposed into the possibility of a (1) nonreflective understanding and (2) the nonobjectifying conceptualization that it [nonreflective understanding] itself provides, that allusive universal called the formal indication." (45)

The method of "formal indication" formulates the implicit understanding that life itself has produced objectifying concepts that merely serve as placeholders for the phenomena that must later be analyzed. These terms indicate in a formal manner the phenomena under scrutiny and leave their determination to the phenomenological bracketing-out and description. As Kiesiel explains, "wards like 'life,' 'lived experience,' 'I myself' drawn from daily life pose a danger of objectification in our descriptions; they cannot be taken univocally, but rather must be understood in their formal character as indicative of certain phenomena of the concrete domain." (46) As Iris Young has argued, radicalized phenomenology promised to "attend to differences without solidifying them into universal categories." (47) Formal indication was thus an attempt to avoid the reduction of phenomena to their representative concepts and to prevent the subsequent "neglect" of these phenomena of lived experience.

Heidegger's reactions and responses to these neo-Kantian objections opened up the way to a pretheoretical solution to the problem of intuition-expression. The suggestion that access and expression have their origin in the immanent historicity of life meant that Heidegger's radical phenomenology did not have to remain within the limitations of Husserlian phenomenology, whose delineation between intuition and expression unwittingly resulted in "the immediacy of intuition" being lost in the "mediacy of expression" and "their initial unity" (in the sense that prereflective life already lives reflectively) becoming interrupted. (48) The non disruptive entry into the historicity of life is made possible by human existence's implicit understanding of itself, which Heidegger called the "hermeneutic intuition" and brought to bear on phenomenology as a method. The hermeneutic intuition could understand "the articulations of life itself, which accrue to the self-experience that occurs in the 'dialectical' return of experiential life to already experienced life." (49) Put differently, the structure of understanding is such that "all of our experiences, beginning with our most direct perceptions, are from the start already expressed, indeed interpreted." (50) Heidegger's answer to Natorp's objections of accessibility and expression is expressive of a desire "to let the facts speak for themselves; and at the same time to claim that there are no such things as uninterpreted facts." (51)

Furthermore, at the methodological level, Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology amounted to a rejection of the Husserlian attempt "to isolate the 'transcendental Ego,' the undifferentiated, pure 'I,' who perceives and constructs the world, but is not involved in it." (52) This turn away from transcendental phenomenology and toward Verstehen brought about a "hermeneutic breakthrough" in which the method and the subject matter are shown to be united, where "a formally indicating hermeneutics [understanding] and a dynamically understood facticity belong essentially together in a close-knit unity." (53) Heidegger asserted in response to Natorp that the method of philosophical questioning cannot be "added on and attached to the questioned object, factual life, externally; rather it is to be understood as the explicit grasping of a basic movement of factual life," by that life itself. (54) At an ontological level, this uniting of matter and method also has serious implications, as I discuss in greater detail below.

Beyond Traditional Ontology: From the Modern Subject to Existence

Phenomenology, it has been suggested above, became the method for letting lived experience show itself in itself. This meant that phenomenology became the method for ontological examination into what life might reveal itself to be, when it is not grasped by theoretical constructs that pay little attention to the concrete phenomena of existence. This reformulation of the phenomenological method reflected Heidegger's ambition to examine the entity thus far encompassed and subsumed under the label subject, without an implicit reliance on the presuppositions that accompanied the term in traditional ontology.

As can be recalled, the hermeneutic breakthrough resulted from the insight that life has the ability to access and reflect "pre-reflectively" on its own experience. Phenomenology, therefore, became connected to the entity that has this ability: Dasein. (55) This interaction between matter and method enabled Heidegger to arrive at a convergence, "a point where they are one and the same: a hermeneutics of facticity." (56) The genitive "of" is a double genitive. It means that understanding, Verstehen, belongs to facticity; while, at the same time, understanding takes human facticity as its object of concern. (57)

As Heidegger himself noted, "'[factivity' is the designation we will use for the character of the being of 'our' 'own' Dasein. More precisely, this expression means: in each case 'this' Dasein in its being-there for a while at the particular time... insofar as it is, in the character of its being, 'there' in the manner of be-ing." (58)

The term Dasein avoids presuppositions about what kind of entity this is (conscious, having mind and body) and launches a mode of analysis that unites method and subject matter. This kind of analysis, Heidegger called Daseinanalytik-existential: "fundamental ontology, from which almost all ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein." (59) Existential analysis concerns itself with the structures of existence (Dasein) in...
order to find out how Dasein is without assuming in advance, as was the case with traditional ontology, what it is. The how and what are related since, as Heidegger has shown in his rejoinder to Natorp, there is an "initial" unity of method and subject matter in human experience. In rejecting the phenomenological isolation of the pure "I" from the perceptual objects, phenomena and ontology become explicitly intertwined: in interpretative phenomenology the "perceiving subject" turns to inquire about itself as the "perceptual object." The analysis of Dasein shows it to be both the investigator and that which is interrogated. (60) Hence, Heidegger's phenomenological concern becomes the manner in which Dasein shows "itself to itself." (61)

John D. Gaputo agrees that "Dasein's understanding of Being is the sole condition under which both ontology and phenomenology are possible." (62) Not only is phenomenology possible only as ontology, but, "only as phenomenology, is ontology possible." (63) Furthermore, Caputo notes, "it is only under the condition that Dasein understands Being that beings can be experienced as beings (phenomenology) and that they can be understood to be (ontology)." (64)

A phenomenology informed by the hermeneutic intuition can, moreover, consider the preconceptions ontology has historically held about this entity called the "modern subject," which Heidegger wanted to interrogate anew without recourse to such presuppositions. (65) To achieve this, however, Heidegger needed to question assumptions of the ontological tradition about subjectivity, through Destruktion or Abbau, which later became the celebrated method of deconstruction. For Heidegger, "[d]estruction is first regarded as a counter to the pervasive tendency of objectification," (66) but it was also considered inseparable from phenomenological examination. In thinking about ontology, the thinker has to be located on a ground, from which to undertake the thought; at the same time, however, the thought has to be aware of the philosophical tradition in which it occurs and that makes its articulation possible.

The notion of deconstruction as Joseph Kockelmans has formulated it provides both of those requirements. It destroys "in the tradition what is philosophically unjustifiable and maintain[s] those primordial experiences from which genuine philosophical insights ultimately flow." (67) The task of fundamental ontology is thus made possible by such a "destructive retrieve": "the destructive retrieve and the phenomenological method cannot be taken to be independent and unrelated procedures; rather both procedures belong intimately together and the one (hermeneutic phenomenology) cannot possibly achieve its goal without the other (destructive retrieve)." (68) Thus the destructive retrieve does not overcome the ontological tradition, but rather searches for and retains its positive possibilities, which are subsequently used to transform the tradition's problematique and preserve it as a possible question. (69)

As was mentioned above, Heidegger's existential analysis sought to dislodge the phenomenally misleading term subject, long associated with the modernist conception given to it by post-Cartesian philosophy, from its paramount position in ontological thought. In order to move beyond these assumptions and begin to analyze the ways in which existence shows itself, Heidegger used the term Dasein, a noun ordinarily meaning existence, as a formal indicator for this entity—which each of us is—whose primary characteristics have yet to be ontologically analyzed. (70) By referring to the entity each of us is as Dasein, which literally means Being-there or there-being, he proceeded to describe this entity in its constitutive elements without presupposing any of the given certainties of the modern era about the subject such as autonomy and self-consciousness. Examining Dasein in its location among others within the world, Heidegger suggested that Dasein was essentially coexistential, a Being-with-others, a being that for the most part does not distinguish itself from others. (71)

Dasein, however, does not consider or comport itself in these terms. Rather, it has a self-understanding as autonomous, self-sufficient and self-actualizing. Autonomy becomes in modernity, as Michel Foucault55 once noted, "a ceaseless task," because it is tentatively achieved by Dasein vehemently denying its other-determined constitution. (72) Embedded as Dasein is within this relational whole that makes up its world, Dasein is a radically situated or "thrown" entity. It is thrown into a world not of its own making, and in order respond to its ability to be itself it must become-proper to itself. The process of becoming-proper, misleadingly called "authenticity," entails not some mastery over itself and others in the world but rather a resoluteness about how it is in the world: thrown, determined by otherness and without a determinate ground or essence.

It is the attention to the facticity of existence in its embedded-ness within the world that enables a "destruction" of the ontological assumptions about the modern subject. This, in turn, affords ontological analysis in the social and human sciences with an understanding of existence from the perspective of a hermeneutically attuned Being-in-the-world. To illustrate some of the ways in which phenomenological analysis destabilizes the assumptions of modern subjectivity, below we reflect on certain phenomena addressed by modern subjectivity, while at the same time exploring some of the ways in which they are deconstructed by radical phenomenological analysis.

Nonsubjectivist Reflections on Anxiety and Death

I suggested in the introduction that hermeneutic phenomenology can be brought to bear on certain assumptions of the modernist ontological project in order to problematize the very ground of political theorizing. In the more applied fields of the human sciences, such as international relations, the modern subject has taken hold and is still generally accepted as the basis of inquiry. C. Fred Alford has observed, in this regard, that in political theory and political science, as well as social science in general, theorizations of the "self" always involve trade-offs. Often authors will "weaken, split, and
lays the foundations for a political theory that encompasses these ontological premises of danger. (73) The purpose of these manipulations of the self is, of course, to write social or political theory that fulfills certain functions and allows certain normative concerns to be realized theoretically. The self, thus, is considered to be little more than "a dependent variable in this or that social theory." (74)

If Alford is correct in his suggestion, this might also explain why ontology is not a major concern in social and political theory, although in some respects this may be changing. (75) Alford contends, not without irony, that for most social scientists "more subtle and complex models [of the self] may be interesting, but they are not necessary to do real social science." (76) That IR theory relies on an ontology centered around the notion of the modern subject is evident in its location alongside other social sciences and in its bestowal of modern subjectivist characteristics onto its primary unit of analysis, the state. It is, moreover, a point stated most explicitly in the ontological analysis provided by Alexander Wendt in his recent monograph. In fact, it could be argued that the construction of a "new orthodoxy" based on "constructivism," to use Friedrich Kratochwil's phrase, (77) ensures the continued reliance of a "rehabilitated" version of modern subjectivity and its identification with the state as a purposive actor.

Philosophically, there have been many manifestations of modern subjectivity, and one should be cautious when offering more general statements about it. (78) Even minimally, however, one can note, with Stephen K. White, that the modern subject is the "assertive, disengaged self who generates distance from its background (tradition, embodiment) and foreground (external nature, other subjects) in the name of accelerating mastery of them." (79) This is, moreover, precisely the subject that refers to itself as "I." For IR, the configuration of modern subjectivity that emanates from Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan has enjoyed a continued prominence, and as such it offers an opportunity to indicate some of the ways in which radicalized phenomenology, and its relation with deconstruction, "unworks" the suppositions of the Hobbesian subject that still inform a number of political accounts. (80) In this way, insights from the existential analysis of Being and Time are interspersed with subjectivist features about fear, death, and self-interest found in Leviathan, pointing the way toward the reconstruction of an account of selfhood that is attuned to the other-determined constitution of existence.

The Ethos of Survival and the Will to Security

The ontological premises of the Hobbesian account are hinged upon the occurrence (substance or, in Heidegger's idiom, presence-at-hand) of entities, which enables Hobbes to make "ample use of it to structure his accounts of the human mind and of society." (81) The Hobbesian configuration of subjectivity links anxiety and death (in the form of the "anxious anticipation of death") to an external source, to the other, encountered as an enemy. (82) Emnity becomes omnipresent and "structural" in the context of the state of nature. The other-as-enemy is not truly other; it is not, in other words, considered as alterity because he is gathered into the fold of the same by Hobbes's account of human nature, where otherness mirrors sameness. Both reflect the quarrelsome disposition of man, his search for glory, and material security. Otherness is as knowable to the modern subject as itself: the Hobbesian theoretic construction achieves the equivalence of the Other with the Same.

While the account of the primacy of conflict in the state of nature might be understood to signify some sort of initial relationality with "world" and other, upon reflection one can see that the political-theoretic intention of this primacy is precisely the opposite. It suggests the impossibility of "civil" relationality prior to regulatory government, reducing, in this way, coexistence to the sum of merely present, nonrelational, and dangerous entities. (83)

In the presocial state of nature of Leviathan, the other serves to generate a suspicious and pessimistic heterology, where the fearful anticipation of death renders survival as the primary responsibility of the self, which might be called "an ethos of survival." (84) Death is to be avoided at all costs: in order to prevent violent death, understood as the self's demise, the subject rationally (that is, in recognition of its interest) agrees to a Covenant by which he gives up all his rights (except the right of self-preservation) for the safety provided by the Leviathan. There is a reiterative process of self-control and self-mastery at work here, and its theoretic result is an account of sociopolitical interaction in which "civil society ... [is considered] the result less of natural inclination than of design and planning." (85) What is equally important to note is that the subject's innate "flash of reason," through which it recognizes the need for government, is brought to the fore by the configuration of self-interest, reason, and anxiety induced by the fearful anticipation of death, resulting, as Leo Strauss has noted, in the self-interested subject rationally realizing that death is the common or real enemy. (86) Therefore, the configuration of the Hobbesian subject around security and self-control usefully results into a theory of controlled interaction. (87)

The agreement of the self-instantiating, self-present, and self-sufficient subject collectively to relinquish its rights through a social contract indicates a desire to secure itself against want and need. The subject "wants to be untroubled, safe, and settled," expressing a will to making itself secure. The other is encountered as co-present by a self imbued with natural right and reason, yet who is, paradoxically, furnished with an unsociable nature. Onto otherness is transferred part of this problematic, and an othering process assigns the other (and every other) as enemy, as dangerous and fearsome, until man's natural reason breaks through and brings about the creation of a civil commonwealth. Such an othering process lays the foundations for a political theory that encompasses these ontological premises of danger.
If this brief exposition of Hobbes's reflections on the subject, anxiety, and death is juxtaposed with Heidegger's phenomenological insights into human existence, it becomes evident that the latter disrupts the constellation of fear, death, and self-interest, as well as the resultant heterophobia (or fear of the other) found in Hobbes's reworking of early modern subjectivity. Heidegger's outlook is fundamentally "worldly" in that it takes the phenomenological motto "to the things themselves" to necessitate an inquiry toward context. As Paul Ricoeur notes, "the foundations of the ontological problem are to be sought in the domain of the relation with the world and not in the domain of the relation with another person." (88)

Thus, Heidegger's phenomenology "is one of worlds—of economies, regions of manifestation, constellations of presencing, games of gathering legein), contexts." (89) The notion of the presocial state of nature where selves encounter other dangerous entities as present rings hollow if one considers, as Reiner Schurmann suggests, that "we always stand inscribed in many such worlds, each of which is phenomenalized according to its own law." (90) World refers to the web of meanings and references through which human existence orients itself. This web constitutes any fundamental understanding of the self and its immediate context, but it is a web that is already infused with otherness, as Dasein does not author meanings and references but finds itself already making use of other-mediated sense and norms for its orientation and activity. Meaning is, in other words, already given in advance of any interaction. Such an understanding of world, then, constitutes a world not of "our making."

In this way, as in others, existential analysis shows Dasein as an entity that is other-determined. Philosophies of the subject, however, "have attempted to explain the world by extrapolating its existence outward from the inner workings of a subject." (91) This becomes evident regarding Dasein's self-perception. When Dasein asks the question "how do I make sense of myself?" or "How do I understand myself?" the answers it gives in its everydayness illustrate that it understands itself as subject, as autonomous and self-sufficient, as author of its own world. Its very unawareness of its own other-determined existence, its heteronomy in other words, shows that its primary understanding of itself as subject is already given to it by the prevalent norms and beliefs in its context, which in this case are fundamentally subjectivist. (92) The phenomenological insight that Dasein's world is already permeated by otherness is manifested precisely in Dasein's self-perception as autonomous and sovereign: the relations in which Dasein is embedded are ontologically prior than and condition Dasein's self-understanding. This is because Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is thrown into "worldly" relations.

Once Dasein twists free of its self-perception as subject and begins the process of becoming-proper to itself, the world is disclosed not as authored by Dasein but, on the contrary, as already imbued with meaning and reference. This already signifies that it is toward otherness that we must look for the creation and sustenance of those meanings by which Dasein makes sense of itself in the world. By using the notion of "mineness," Heidegger explains how Dasein uniquely understands and appropriates these meanings and ways of being in the world into which it is thrown. In this regard, Heidegger's phenomenology of average everydayness embeds the entity in the world and similarly situates the other as well. The other is never properly encountered anew: instead, otherness is pervasive and constitutive for selfhood and for coexistence as such.

As Walter Davis notes in reference to being-in-the-world, "in reflecting on myself the first thing I confront is the massive presence of the other." (93) The subject that is disposed toward a solipsistic determination of itself, by itself, is but a construct of the reiterative process of masterful interaction with the other and the world at large. Heidegger's discussion of Dasein as thrown into the world tries to show that, on the contrary, our relationship to the other is a fundamental determination of our being because the other is already present in the initial constitution of inwardsness," (94) an inwardsness that can be understood as always already looking outward, toward the world and others.

The Displacement of Fear with Disclosive Anxiety

Viewed phenomenologically, the subject's desire to secure itself against want indicates that the modern subject "wants to cover over its very being as needy, as Darbung," (95) In this vein, John Caputo suggests that "it is because factual life is disturbed by everyday concerns," because its Being is an issue for it, "that it seeks to secure itself against want"; the Hobbesian subject's will to making-secure arises from the need to "look whole not privatio ... as if it were without care, sine cura, secure--even though that very desire for security is itself a (deficient) mode of care [Sorge]." (96) Hobbesian subjectivity has a right to the world: man's natural right results in the creation of a perspective on the world as possessed and authored by the subject. This perspective denies an understanding of Dasein's Being as care (in the sense of concern and anxiousness for its being) and its ground as nothingness (in Heidegger's formulation "Being-the-basis-of-annihilation"). The subject conceals the anxiety induced both by being an entity thrown into a world not of its own making and by having no certain ground. It suppresses its anxiety about its Being by conceiving of the world as a state of nature, a "warre of all against all," whose structural conditions and the presence of widespread enmity lead to the externalization of anxiety about its own Being, and linking it to a fear of the other.

When Heidegger's analysis of anxiety is brought to bear on the Hobbesian schema, Hobbes' schema becomes evident that it is confused, or better still, conflated with the phenomenon of fear. Anxiety, Heidegger insists, cannot be confused with the phenomenon of fear as, arguably, occurs in Leviathan. Heidegger agrees that "obviously these are kindred phenomena" and their confusion or conflation is further complicated "by the fact that for the most part they have not been
distinguished from one another: that which is fear, gets designated as 'anxiety,' while that which has the character of the anxiety, gets called 'fear.'” (97) While fear is an affect that corresponds to something in the world that is fearsome, and becomes more so as it approaches Dasein, what Heidegger designates as "anxiety" has no concrete worldly referent: "Anxiousness as attunement is a way of Being-in-the-world; that in the face of which we have anxiety is thrown Being-in-the-world; that which we have anxiety about is our ability to be in the world. Thus the entire phenomenon of anxiety shows Dasein as factically existing Being-in-the-world." (98)

Anxiety is generated from the general constitution of Dasein as care and as being-thrown, which cause Dasein to flee in the face of itself constituted as such. "In falling, Dasein turns away from itself. That in the face of which it thus shrinks back must, in any case, be an entity with the character of threatening; yet this entity has the same kind of Being as the one that shrinks back: it is Dasein itself." (99) It cannot, then, be fear that guides Dasein's falling, for fear is that affect that "comes from entities within-the-world." (100)

The conflation of anxiety and fear in Hobbes results in the causal attribution of anxiety, which is related to Dasein's constitution as "care" (Sorge), to otherness. In seeking an external referent, fear is displaced toward the other. The encounter of the other-as-enemy and the assignment of fear to the other can be understood, then, within the framework of Dasein's inability to accept itself having no ground, as being the basis of a nullity. Othering is disclosed as an inauthentic response to Dasein's own anxious Being in an attempt to externalize the anxiety that emerges from Dasein's finitude and groundlessness and to direct it toward otherness. The heterophobia found in Hobbes's reworking of early modern subjectivity is shown to be displaced, from anxiety about Dasein's thrownness and care for its Being to the other. The assumption that the fear! anxiety is the result of the omnipresent other-as-enemy, moreover, leads to a political theory in which such fear/anxiety can be avoided through the right sort of regulation and governance. "In the last instance," writes John Dunn, "humans' political authority is a rational response to the overwhelming motivational power of human fearfulness. It rests practically upon the systematization of the passion of fear." (101)

Heidegger's distinction between fear and anxiety reveals that in Leviathan anxiety is transformed, from an affect disclosive of Dasein's Being as "care" to fear of an other. In the Hobbesian construction, the conflated fear/anxiety is always related to danger, and it is comprehended as being induced by the other within the state of nature. Fear is displaced to an external other because there is no phenomenological reduction of the phenomenon of anxiety and of Dasein as "care." Anxiety is not traced to Dasein fleeing from itself in its misperception of itself, avoiding a confrontation with itself as thrown and finite. Rather, fear/anxiety can be seen only by the Hobbesian subject as linked to its encounter with the other. The assumption of a completed self, which encounters the "world" and the other, distorts the disclosure of thrownness and care by anxiety. In flight from its Being, the Hobbesian subject attributes its anxiety to fear of the other. Furthermore, if one accepts that the institution of the commonwealth is possible because the subject realizes that death, and not the other, is man's common enemy, then it becomes apparent that what the subject "fears" in the state of nature is its own mortality and finite nature. (102) It "fears," in other words, its own finite constitution within the world.

For Heidegger, contrary to such a fearful heterology, being with others in the world is the initial and primary way in which Dasein finds itself. Anxiety serves a positive function because it brings to the fore, it phenomenologically discloses, the thrownness and falling of Dasein, and acts as a reminder that Dasein's Being is an issue for it. For Heidegger, the other is neither the source of fear nor an impetus to regulatory government, as it is for Hobbes. On the contrary, the other is to be welcomed: rather than fearing the other as an enemy and distancing one's self from him, personally or institutionally, Dasein seeks the safety of companionship with the other and absorption in public affairs in the flight of its anxious Being: "what this turning-away does is precisely to turn thither towards entities within-the-world by absorbing itself in them." (103) The other delivers us from anxiety, the unsettling experience of which "makes the other an inordinately sought source of comfort and support." (104)

Therefore, phenomenologically bracketing out phenomena such as fear and anxiety disaggregates the reiterative processes of establishing certainty as the ground of a contingent self from fear of the other. This disaggregation problematizes Hobbesian political theoretic construction and can be seen as a political act of resistance enunciated in two movements. First, it denies political theory the justification of the othering process through fear and the preservation of life. Second, it disrupts the will to security by unraveling the constellation of anxiety and death, which is part and parcel of the Hobbesian configuration of modern subjectivity.

The Hermeneutics of Finitude

Just as the phenomena of fear and anxiety can be bracketed out and examined with respect to the selfhood to which they point, the same can be said for the phenomenon of death. For Hobbes, death is equated with the body's demise, and is thought of as the end of life. Violent death is to be avoided at all costs, even if this entails the relinquishment of the subject's natural will and right. Finitude, in this regard, is considered as the deprivation of life, as being-finished. Fear of violent death is, in the Hobbesian schema, the condition for the creation of the commonwealth because it brings about the acquiescence of man to regulatory government.

Heidegger, however, insists on a distinction between finitude, on the one hand, and the death of Dasein, understood as its biological end, on the other. (105) For Heidegger, death is Dasein's ownmost possibility. This interpretation denies that
the phenomenon of finitude can be understood only as physical demise: "Finitude is not the being-finished-off of an existent deprived within itself of the property of completion, butting up against and stumbling over its own limit." (106) The distinction drawn between one's biological end and the ontological understanding of finitude enables a denial of death as a privation, which is perhaps contrary to its more commonplace understanding. "Finitude is not privation," (107) writes Jean-Luc Nancy, and in denying death as privative, the existential analytic reveals the phenomenal content of finitude as a possibility, which is one's ownmost, nonrelational and unsurpassable. It relates finitude not to the "end" but to a radical contingency, a lack of certainty that is, para doxically, Dasein's very own "groundless" ground. Thus, regulatory government cannot mitigate against finitude understood in this way. It is merely a spectral postponement, a concealment of the lack of ground through action.

The phenomenological investigation of finitude, therefore, does not merely disrupt the fear of violent death, with the understanding of finitude as possibility: it also helps to dispel thinking in terms of essence. Nancy suggests, in this regard, that "death = the nullity of essence," (108) the invalidation of which lets existence be seen in all its contingency. By arresting the unfolding of essence, it allows existence to come forth undetermined. "In other words, toward death would mean toward life, if 'life' did not refer too simply to the contrary of death." (109) Since death is Dasein's possibility, this understanding allows Dasein to let itself be seen as the Being that is determined by its relationship with its end, and that always and from the start carries its death, as its unsurpassable possibility, with it. In this way, "finitude" should therefore be attributed to what carries its end as its own, that is what is affected by its end (limit, cessation, beyond-essence) as its end (goal, finishing, completion)-and is affected by it not as a limit imposed from elsewhere ... but as a trance, transcendence, or passing away so originary that the origin has already come apart there." (110)

Unlike the Hobbesian problematic that theorizes the regulation of relations aimed at the avoidance of violent death, it can be argued that Heidegger shows precisely that "privation annuls itself essentially" while, "finitude affirms itself." (111) The thought of finitude as possibility highlights, moreover, the contribution that a philosophy of the limit might make to a reconsideration of world politics: it disrupts an understanding of death and its avoidance as the justification for contractarian theorizing, but also mitigates against the reduction of the political to the decision in the face of an "existential threat." (112) Where the Hobbesian subject, as an inauthentic Dasein, suppresses its anxiety (by displacing it onto other in terms of fear) in order to maintain its self-certainty in the face of its radical contingency and embeddedness in the world, the self understood as "care" appropriates its anxiety and becomes ready for it, and for death as its ownmost possibility.

While, as Stuart Umphrey notes, for political theory "[Hobbes's] teaching ... remains to be overcome in fact" because "our way of regarding things political is still predominantly Hobbesian," (113) the consideration of a phenomenological method attuned to the facticity of existence provides a challenge to the determination of political and worldly phenomena in a Hobbesian subjectivist manner. In addition to the unworking of political subjectivity, it primarily encourages the relinquishment of the inside/outside dichotomy, whose pertinence is questioned. This methodological turn shows the same to itself as other, and the inside does not need to guard itself against the outside: otherness is not only already internal but also pervasive. In this way, the predication of strands of international theory on a "dangerous" ontology and pessimistic heterology can be challenged. This cannot be regarded as an outdated task because, as Mary Dietz, argues, Hobbesian political theory "is at least partly constitutive of the ways in which we continue to understand and describe our own political practices," particularly as regards the framing of the nonrelational subject of politics, the other-as-enemy, and the theoretic right of self-preservation. (114)

Finally, it is important to examine the notion of self-interest as a central term of modern political subjectivity—related to both fear and death in the Hobbesian configuration of the subject of politics and serving a pivotal role in the discursive creation of the autonomous and largely self-sufficient subject. Concluding the juxtaposition with a final phenomenological consideration of interest, furthermore, brings forward the possibilities for ontology and international political theory merging with the exercise of radical phenomenology itself and enables the decentering of subjectivist political theory, which is the condition of possibility of articulating a coexistential sensibility.

From Self-interest to Care

How do subjects of modern politics interact with each other? How are their relationships manifested? In a contractarian conception of politics, such as the Hobbesian one that serves as the present example, instituting and regulating "relation" comes from the notion of "interest." For a subjectivist understanding of politics, the notion of interest "imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible." (115) In addition to its being a lens through which the phenomena of politics become intelligible, the concept of interest and understandings of "political association" are intertwined because the modern subject, which is ontologically nonrelational, requires a connection through which sociability is expressed. In a nonrelational conception of the "world" of politics, the phenomenon of political relationality must be explicated with the aid of that which both institutes and regulates relat ion. As a requirement for the existence of relation, the notion of interest reconciles the subject to its sociability by bringing together the disparate phenomena of "sociation." The notion of "interest" serves, therefore, not only to regulate relation or interaction but also to effect the relation of subject to subject and subject to "political association." By relating and (inter)acting according to its own knowable interest, the (Hobbesian)
subject receives its regulative political connection to otherness and becomes relational as such. The distinct characteristic of the notion of "interest" is, therefore, that it regulates and, as a consequence, institutes relation in politics in the absence of prior constitutive relationality, the concealment of which is brought about by the modernist understanding of subjectivity." (6)

In this vein, Jurgen Habermas's discussion of this distinctly modern conception of politics elucidated by modern social and political thought highlights that, with the advent of the modern subject, politics relinquishes its role in instructive socialization, through which one learned how to cultivate not only the ways of customary participation in the communal space but also how to properly conduct and improve oneself, in the sense of techne tou biou, or technologies of the self. (117) Politics, suggests Habermas, inevitably becomes the mere "regulation of social intercourse" based on diverse "self-interests. (118) As a consequence, the self-interested decision to agree to a societal contract can be seen as necessary in order to articulate the framework that constitutes and, at the same time, institutionalizes relationships between subjects, as well as between government and subjects.

Bracketing out the phenomena of sociation enables a phenomenological shift from "interest" to "care" (where, again, the term refers to one's own concern and radical embeddedness in the world), which brings to the fore Dasein's relationality that is not reducible to, or dependent on, a calculus of interest. On the basis of its being as care, Dasein can admit its anxiety for its ability to be (its Being-free for its possibilities) and for its thrownness as Being-in-the-world; Dasein can fully inhabit itself as "thrown projection." (119) With the notion of "care," the thinking subject's reliance on calculations of interest is transformed: Heidegger's privileging of facticity asserts a certain embeddedness in the world that serves to condition the "I" such that it understands itself beyond the terms of interest. Rather, the self can think of its relations in terms of possibilities, of "various ways of comporting myself—namely, cogitations—as ways of Being amidst entities within the world." (120) The shift to "care" offers a fuller disclosure of facticity and is concerned, not with self-interest, but with a certain resolve that Dasein can exhibit that is eager to discover "what is factically possible at the time." (121) Having resolve, then, can be thought of as the ascertaining of the factual situation, as distinct from the general situation, and "brings the Being of the "there" into the existence of its Situation." (122) Interest can be said to have a similar function for the Hobbesian subject, but unlike interest, having resolve is not isolating or oppositional. It "does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating 'I.' And how should it, when resolve as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than Being-in-the-world? Resolve brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-amidst what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others." (23)

The consideration of care attempts to unwork the reliance of the Hobbesian subject on interest as the measurement and institution of relationality that leads to a certain "politics of self-sufficiency." As discussed above, this displacement can begin with the concerted disruption of the sustaining characteristics of Hobbesian subjectivity that still permeate political discourse, prominent among which are the notions of "fear," "death," and "self-interest." This displacement has at its core the achievement of Dasein's recognition of its fundamental relationality to its world and others, and, this article argues, offers a direction to ontologically disrupt the predication of international political theory on for ms of subjectivity that are not attuned to the interconnected facticity of human and global relations.

From Self-Sufficiency to Coexistence: Ontology and Political Theory

The "unworking" of political subjectivity, which a phenomenological consideration of human experience discloses, creates an opening or path toward non-self-sufficiency, which can now be defined as the desire or end that not only "accommodates" coexistence but makes its disclosure possible. It allows heteronomous selfhood to be revealed as that understanding of human existence whose disclosure is made possible by the shattering—foundering and failure—of the modern subject of self-sufficiency. The unworking of the modern subject, of which the Hobbesian self is a prominent configuration, can be regarded as the dissolution of mastery and self-control. Proper understanding of Dasein "bends to the task at hand and risks 'genuine failure.'" (124)

Dasein's relationality, evident through its understanding as "thrown projection" on possibilities proper for its heteronomous constitution, can bring about "genuine failure": it relates Dasein's embeddedness in the world to the shattering of the sovereign self and helps to show that where subjectivity was effortlessly posited, phenomenological examination reveals only heteronomy. Confronting one's anxiety for its own being shatters the subject's will to security. As David Farrell Krell explains, becoming-proper can be likened to foundering or to the disintegration of modern subjectivity. But upon such "failure" of the will to security, Dasein can take itself up as anxious and ready for its possibilities. "Failure or foundering. Scheitern: Failure as a trembling or agitation to the point of disintegration. Erchutterung. In a word, shattering." (125) Failure to be a subject is the outcome of the phenomenological investigation of the structures of human existence, "whose very genuineness, the genuineness of its understanding, guaranteed precisely insofar as it genuinely shatters." (126)

The incessant unworking of political subjectivity requires that the self ceases to be determined in unitary terms. To reverse the commonly held notion that interest-based decisions and agreements institute political relationality, explaining in this way the emergence of civil society and government, radical embeddedness in the world (Being-in-the-world) must be seen as primary, or at least as coappearing with more formal instances of "political association." When sociability itself and the heteronomous self are shown to jointly appear, there can be thought a "comparation" of phenomena of...
coexistence: "Comparition must therefore mean ... that 'appearing,' that is, coming into the world and being in the world, existence as such, is strictly inseparable, indissociable from the cum, from the with, wherein it finds not only its place and its taking-place, but also--and it is the same thing--its fundamental ontological structure." (127)

With "comparition," otherness also is allowed to show itself standing at the outset of selfhood. The heteronomous self does not require mechanist concepts, such as interest, in order to be related to the other. In this sense, "comparition" might be thought as "the appearing to and with an other." (128) The disavowal of a politics of self-sufficiency, therefore, also aims to account for the simultaneous appearance of both relation and singularity (the instance of the individual person). Nancy notes, in this regard, that "such a politics consists, first of all, in testifying that there is singularity only where a singularity ties itself up with other singularities." (129) This codisclosed inherent plurality, or multiplicity, of singularity hopes to arrest a return to a subject-driven politics where "politics considered as a real practice has always been taken to subserve (i.e., to originate and culminate in) a self-identical, self-sufficient, self-determining entity." (130) Non-self-sufficiency, then, is "an end that can serve double duty as ethical imperative commanding respect for others and existential condition securing the open endedness (of a-teleology) of political life." (131)

In sum, then, the above discussion has illustrated the unworking of fundamental terms of the Hobbesian configuration of political subjectivity through a juxtaposition of Heidegger's phenomenological discussions of related or identical phenomena. It has been shown that anxiety, which is often confused with fear, has a discursive function for Dasein's own existence as thrown, whereas the fear of the other initiates an othering process that misdirects anxiety in the face of Dasein's Being to the other. Finitude, moreover, is shown to be the self's ownmost possibility, an indication not only of mortality but of groundlessness and radical contingency. Comportment on the basis of care, finally, reveals the particularities of the factual situation into which Dasein is thrown, but avoids the reduction of sociability and relationality to calculations of interest. Ascertaining the contours of the factual situation through resolve, furthermore, on the basis of one's Being as care, leads to a mode of comportment toward beings in the world that avoids the isolating and regulative effects of self-interest. The usage of phenomenology, therefore, illustrates the possibility of a hermeneutic shift away from the subjectivist international political theory and toward the recovery of a politically non-self-sufficient self that takes up its coexistence, a radical relationality, as its facticity.

This article has suggested that reflection must seek to access the phenomena of living experience, and the selfhood toward which they point, because it is in achieving this kind of access that it can truly be critical. Radical phenomenology can be pursued as a methodology of the critical human sciences, with far-reaching implications for ontological reflection and theoretical construction. (132)

By attending to the structures of existence as they show themselves, hermeneutic phenomenology becomes the method through which ontology can be fulfilled, and vice versa. In the case of political enquiry, phenomenology can unsettle the reliance on the modern subject as the basis of theorectic construction. So infused with "theoretic detritus" is our understanding of phenomena of sociation that their content is obscured or, rather, overdetermined in terms of the modern subject, as I have tried to illustrate, in a rather eclectic fashion, above. (133)

Hermeneutic phenomenology, as understood by Heidegger, brings to the fore the subjectivist features of politics and makes their usage problematic. This is the self-stated task of the deconstructive enterprise of political philosophy, which has called into question its own reliance on traditional categories of politics. "The task of philosophy is precisely to destroy the fantasy of a falsely homogeneous and unified world while displaying the multiplicity and heterogeneity of the fields of signification which we inhabit," (134) writes the phenomenologist Jean Greisch. A phenomenological method broadly conceived, then, provides an unexpected challenge to the determination of our worldly phenomena in a Hobbesian manner. It is not only the Hobbesian configuration of subjectivity, however, that becomes disrupted. It is the very usage of the modern subject as the basis of social and political theory. The consideration of hermeneutic phenomenology, therefore, reveals possibilities that had been hitherto obscured.

Radical phenomenology's attention to ontology enables it to challenge the self-sufficient subject of modern politics, whose characteristics have long been projected onto the state as a purposive actor. In addition, it has been argued in this article, that radical phenomenology reveals the actually other-determined constitution of the self--what one might call its "heteronomy." It was discussed as the method that makes possible a letting-be-seen of Dasein's constitution as Being-in-the-world. (135) This embeddedness in a world always already constructed by otherness, and one that is not of Dasein's sole making, thus also demonstrates what Michael Dillon has usefully called the "anteriority of relation." This anteriority, or priority, of relation before selfhood, moreover, has profound ramifications for the IR discipline. While the tracing and elaboration of these would actually require a treatise of a much greater scope, it is nevertheless possible to outline two of them here.

First, and perhaps most importantly, the engagement of radical phenomenology with the facticity of the self disrupts anti-contests the assumptions of autonomy and self-sufficiency, toward which the modern subject "ceaselessly" strives, and shows them to be inadequate theorectic constructs for social and international theory. Indeed, what emerges on the basis of the discussion of this article is that facticity itself cannot be overrun by theorectic construction based on prior metaphysical structures. Facticity is thus a call to attend to "the things themselves" that cannot be ignored in theorizing about an increasingly globalizing world.
This focus on facticity, with which we wish to infuse IR, does not seek to "privilege ontology and assume that the world discloses itself by affecting our senses, and that, therefore, we have come to some primitive or basic observational statements which 'tell it like it is.'" (136) Far from being a reduction to sense data, the focus on facticity is precisely interested in finding an appropriate, nonreductive means of access to the complexity of worldly phenomena, such as the globalization of social relations, where the existential analytic's unconcealment of the plurality of worlds in which we are "inscribed" sustains a complex picture of the self's "world," which cannot be reduced to domestic and social, on the one hand, and international and unsocial, on the other.

Second, and closely related to the first point, radical phenomenology also points to the need for a different thinking about coexistence and community that is not based on modern accounts of subjectivity. Rather, conceptions of coexistence and community must resist the assumptions about the modern subject that reduce conceptions of coexistence and community to additive states of multiple subjects, usually regulated by the mechanism of the contract. The social contract becomes a necessity for thinking grounded in the subject because of the nonrelational nature of this subjectivity. As Van den Abbeele has argued, "the notion of social contract assumes the prior constitution of self-determining subjects who 'freely' aggregate to form a community." (137) Not only does the notion of contract occlude the whence of its subjects' constitution (usually through the delegation of it to human nature), but it "forgets the differences between subjects that may obtain in such a way as to obviate, or at least complicate, the presumption of their absolute equality." (138) When radical phenomenology shows the self to be already permeated with otherness, already coexistential, the traditional political-theoretic conceptions of coexistence and community, as well as their regulation via mechanisms of contract, can be avoided. In this sense, the heteronomy revealed by attending to facticity demands original reconceptualizations of community beyond the notions of either Gemeinschaft or Gesselschaft.

The deeper implications of radical phenomenology for the analysis of international relations, in short, is that the "regulative ideal" of theory must be abandoned. In other words, bearing in mind the insights generated by radical phenomenology, theory can no longer be seen as consisting of establishing relations between non-relational subjects, self-sufficient in an ethical and political sense, but must reflect the priority of relation over subjectivity. In sum, phenomenology reveals a coexistential sensibility already present in the structures of existence, which thinking about global politics can espouse, once deconstructed of its subjectivist ontology. To this extent, phenomenology also does not purport to be "finished system of propositions," (139) but rather amounts to a combination of critical thought and attention to concrete experience that allows a kind of inquiry that can be "alert also to the prereflective underpinnings of reflection, or the linkage of thought and non-thought." (140)

Notes

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(2.) See, for example, Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), p. 90.


(6.) Ibid., p. 47.

(7.) Ibid., p. 47 (emphasis added).


(9.) Ibid.


(12.) Ibid., p. 16.


(14.) Ibid., p. 16.

(15.) Ibid., p. 16.


(17.) Warnock, note 10, p. 35.

(18.) Ibid., p. 35.

(19.) Sokolowski, note 11, p. 15.

(20.) Kearney, note 13, p. 19.

(21.) Ibid., p. 13.


(29.) Ibid., p. 125.

(30.) The postwar years witnessed the interactions and debates between neo-Kantianism, proponents of which included figures such as Paul Natorp, Heinrich Rickert (Heidegger's doctoral supervisor), and Wilhelm Windelband, and phenomenology, as advocated by Husserl: Caputo, note 16, pp. 84-105, and Jacques Taminiaux, "Heidegger and Husserl's Logical Investigations," in Sallis, ed., note 5, pp. 58-83. Neo-Kantianism was the reigning philosophical movement at the time, and Heidegger made it his task to "expose the primacy of the theoretical attitude" in its methodology and in the philosophy of values in general: Kovacs, note 28, p. 125. The critical exchanges between neo-Kantianism and phenomenology revolved around Husserl's call "for a radical break with any philosophy which is even remotely oriented toward a worldview": Kisiel, note 25, pp. 38-39. In 1919, Heidegger criticized neo-Kantianism, arguing that it understood itself as "the critical science of values which, 'based as it is on the basic acts of conscio usness and their norms, has in its system an ultimate and necessary tendency toward a worldview,"' despite neo-Kantianism regarding worldviews to be the personal affair of the individual and not the focus of philosophy as such: Martin Heidegger, Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, Gesamtausgabe 56/57, ed. Bernd Heimbuchel (Frankfurt-on-Main: V. Klostermann, 1987), p. 12, cited in Kisiel, note 25, p. 39. Heidegger supported the Husserlian perspective, arguing that worldview and philosophy are incompatible. This notion of philosophy as radically separated from worldview led Heidegger to pursue "a brand of philosophy ... which would have to place it outside any connection with the ultimate human questions": Heidegger, Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, p. 11, cited in Kisiel, note 25. Rather, philosophy's vocation did not consist in building and developing a worldview because, for Heidegger, "the true essence of philosophy is something quite
unique beyond any connection with ideology, worldview, and teachings about the ultimate destiny and meaning of human living"; Kovacs, note 28, p. 124.

(31.) Yet it must be said that the harsh opposition between neo-Kantianism and phenomenology was rooted in the very proximity of the two "movements." At their inception, both were predicated on their ability to provide "the scientific ideal of knowledge with a rigorous foundation" Kearney, note 13, p. 16.


(33.) Kisiel, note 25, p. 48.

(34.) Ibid., p. 48.

(35.) Ibid., p. 48; see also Heidegger, note 30, pp. 101-111.

(36.) Kovacs, note 28, p. 129.

(37.) Ibid., p. 129 (emphasis added).


(39.) For Schleiermacher and Dilthey, see Kisiel, note 25, pp. 89-93 and 100-105, respectively. See also David Farrell Krell, Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1992).

(40.) Kisiel, note 25, p. 48 (emphasis added).

(41.) Ibid., Kisiel, p. 48; see also Heidegger, note 30, pp. 99-102.

(42.) Kisiel, note 25, p. 48.

(43.) Ibid., p. 48.

(44.) Ibid., pp. 48-49.

(45.) Ibid., p. 49 (emphasis and bracketed insertion mine).

(46.) Ibid., p. 121.

(47.) Iris M. Young, "Pregnant Subjectivity and the Limits of Existential Phenomenology," in Ihde and Silverman, eds., note 11, p. 25.

(48.) Kisiel, note 25, p. 49.

(49.) Ibid., pp. 55-56.

(50.) Ibid., P. 49; see also Heidegger, note 26, pp. 31, 32).


(52.) Warnock, note 10, 49.

(53.) Kisiel, note 25, p. 23 (bracketed insertion mine).


(56.) Kisiel, note 25, P. 21.


(58.) Heidegger, note 55, p. 5.

(59.) Heidegger, note 26, p. 34.
(60.) Ibid., p. 24.

(61.) Sallis, note 5, P. 47.

(62.) Caputo, note 16, p. 103.

(63.) Heidegger, note 26, p. 60.

(64.) Caputo, note 16, p. 103 (emphasis added).


(66.) Kisiel, note 25, p. 117.


(68.) Ibid., p. 108.


(70.) It should be noted that when Heidegger refers to ontology, he means fundamental ontology, which has to do with the Being of entities. Traditionally, ontology refers to the study of the entities themselves. However, all ontologies ought to take their issue from fundamental ontology, which is informed by its attention to the facticity of phenomena.

(71.) Heidegger, note 26, p. 154.


(74.) Ibid., p. vii.

(75.) Stephen K. White, "Weak Ontology and Political Reflection," Political Theory 25, no. 4 (1997): 502-523, documents a recent rise in interest in ontology and in JR. Wendt, note 2, has attempted to conduct an ontological examination of the state system.

(76.) Alford, note 73, p. 3 (bracketed insertion and emphasis mine).


(79.) White, note 75, p. 503.


(82.) See Louiza Odysseos, "Dangerous Ontologies: The Ethos of Survival and Ethical Theorising in International Relations," Review of International Studies 28, no. 2 for an exploration of this theme.

(83.) In the sense of present-at-hand, see (Heidegger, note 26, pp. 79-82, 95-107). For a fuller consideration, see Louiza Odysseos, Exploring the Ontological Basis of Coexistence in International Relations: Subjectivism, Heidegger, and the Heteronomy of Ethics and Politics (unpublished MS).

(84.) Odysseos, note 82.


(90.) Ibid.


(94.) Ibid.


(96.) Ibid., p. 67.

(97.) Heidegger, note 26, p. 230.

(98.) Heidegger, note 26, p. 235 (translation modified).

(99.) Ibid., p. 230.

(100.) Ibid., p. 230.


(102.) Strauss, note 86, p. 22.

(103.) Heidegger, note 26, p. 230.

(104.) Davis, note 93, p. 119. At the same time, of course, the faceless other, the public embodiment of otherness, is the foremost manifestation of thrownness in the face of which Dasein flees. As Davis remarked, "the 'they' is the most immediate issue of anxiety because anxiety and inauthenticity are virtually indistinguishable at the "origin" of experience": ibid., p. 119.


(107.) Ibid.

(108.) Ibid., p. 32.


(110.) Ibid., pp. 31-32.

(111.) Ibid., p. 30.

(112.) See, for example, Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1996). It also provides a context in which the "right to self-preservation" might itself be rethought. On this issue, see Peg


(114.) Dietz, note 80, p. 4.


(116.) Autonomy has to do with freedom and "absolute autoactivity, a spontaneity and a power of man to determine himself on his own": Julia Kristeva, Crisis of the European Subject, trans. Susan Fairfield (New York: Other Press, 2000), p. 119.


(118.) Habermas, note 117, p. 43.

(119.) Heidegger, note 26, p. 243.

(120.) Heidegger, note 26, p. 254 (translation modified).

(121.) Ibid., p. 345 (emphasis added). On resolve or resoluteness, see ibid., pp. 343-347.

(122.) Ibid., p. 347.

(123.) Ibid., p. 344 (translation modified).


(125.) Ibid., p. 155.


(131.) Ingram, note 128, p. 107.

(133.) For an elaboration of this point, see Charles Guignon, introduction to Guignon, ed., The Cambridge companion to Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993).


(136.) Kratochwil, note 77, p. 73.

(137.) Van Den Abbeele, note 91, p. xi.

(138.) Ibid.

(139.) Dallmayr, ed., note 85, p. 3.

(140.) Ibid., p. 4.

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